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Abstract: 
New media (highly interactive digital technology for creating, sharing, and consuming 
information) affords users a great deal of control over their informational diets. As a result, many 
users of new media unwittingly encapsulate themselves in epistemic bubbles (epistemic 
structures, such as highly personalized news feeds, that leave relevant sources of information out 
(Nguyen forthcoming)). Epistemically paternalistic alterations to new media technologies could 
be made to pop at least some epistemic bubbles. We examine one such alteration that Facebook 
has made in an effort to fight fake news and conclude that it is morally permissible.  We further 
argue that many epistemically paternalistic policies can (and should) be a perennial part of the 
internet information environment. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1995, Nicholas Negroponte introduced the idea of The Daily Me, a virtual newspaper perfectly 
custom-fitted to each reader's particular taste. As Cass Sunstein elaborates:  
If your taste runs to William Shakespeare, your Daily Me could be all Shakespeare, all 
the time. […] Maybe your views are left of center, and you want to read stories fitting 
with what you think about climate change, equality, immigration, and the rights of labor 
unions. […] [W]ith the Daily Me everyone could enjoy an architecture of control. Each 
of us would be in fully charge of what we see and hear (Sunstein 2017, 1). 
At the time, the Daily Me may have sounded like an improvement on that of traditional news. 
But we now know it has substantial drawbacks. 
Consider the Michigan resident who received media attention for being “surprised to hear 
there was anything negative in the Mueller Report at all about President Trump” (Golshan 2019). 
The resident made her statement over a month after the Report, which indeed contained many 
negative revelations about the president and received much media attention for this, had been 
made available to the public (USDOJ 2019). When the resident made her statement, it was hard 
to imagine that any American could think that the Report was anything but negative for the 
President. Yet, she thought the Report exonerated him.  
When the resident did learn that the Report was negative, it was through serendipity. At 
the time, the only Republican representative calling for impeachment on the basis of the Report 
happened to be hers. He held a townhall to share his thoughts about the Report. Were it not for 
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this, the resident would have gone on believing that there was no evidence that the President had 
obstructed justice. 
The Michigan resident is not unique. Many of us have been made epistemically worse off 
through our exercise of the powers granted to us by new media, highly interactive digital 
technology for creating, sharing, and consuming information. Among its affordances, new media 
fosters epistemic bubbles, social epistemic structures that leave out relevant sources of 
information (Nguyen, forthcoming).1 It does this by ferreting out our preferences and adapting to 
them automatically. As Eli Pariser explains, 
The new generation of Internet filters look at the things you seem to like […] and tries to 
extrapolate. They are prediction engines, constantly creating and refining a theory of who 
you are and what you’ll do and want next. Together, these engines create a unique 
universe of information for each of us and […] alters the way we encounter ideas and 
information (Pariser 2012, 9).  
It’s worse than this, though. New media also feeds us information designed to influence us based 
on those preferences and proclivities. That is, it doesn’t merely reinforce our beliefs, it seeds and 
nurtures new ones (cf. Alfano et al. 2018). 
 
1 The term “epistemic bubble” bears some semblance to a more popular term, “filter bubble” 
(which was coined by Pariser). A filter bubble is a kind of epistemic bubble that is created by 
internet filters that attempt to show you what you want to see, by extrapolating from your past 
behavior and the behavior people like you (Pariser 2012). 
4 
 
 
This is a preprint of a chapter that appears in revised form in Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: 
Conceptions, Justifications, and Implications, edited by Amiel Bernal and Guy Axtell (London: Roman & 
Littlefield, 2020): pp. 29-44. This version is free to view and download for private research and study 
only. Please cite to the final version. 
 
YouTube, for example, will recommend videos to you based on what you have watched. 
This is done using a machine learning algorithm that is responsible for more than 70% of the 
time people spend on the site (Roose 2019). The YouTube algorithm is good at showing users 
what they are inclined to keep watching. For instance, watching videos from the liberal, 
progressive Young Turks is likely to lead to recommendations from CNN, and the channels of 
Barack Obama, Elizabeth Warren, and Bernie Sanders (Kaiser and Rauchfleish 2018). Viewing 
videos from the Fox News channel is likely to lead to recommendations from alt-right, men’s 
rights, and conspiracy theory channels (Kaiser and Rauchfleish 2018). Given that two thirds of 
Americans get news through social media (with one in five getting news from YouTube) (Pew 
Research Center 2018b), it is no wonder we can consume a lot of news but be mis- or under-
informed about current affairs of monumental importance. 
Combine this with new media’s immense popularity2, and there is cause for concern. 
Consider “vaccine hesitancy.” The reluctance or refusal to vaccinate has surged in recent years 
and made its way to the World Health Organization’s list, “Ten threats to global health in 2019” 
(World Health Organization 2019). Much of the popularity of “anti-vaxxing," a movement that 
aims to spread vaccine hesitancy, is owed to new media (specifically, sites such as Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube) (Hussain et al. 2018). And now, two decades after the federal 
 
2 To give a sense of this: In the U.S., 69% of adults are on Facebook, 73% use YouTube, and 
45% are on Twitter, and the median American uses three social media sites (Pew Research 
Center 2018a; 2019). Usage is even higher among teens. As of 2015, 97% of 12th graders used 
social media sites (Twenge 2017). 
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government declared it “eliminated,” measles has returned to the United States (Joy 2019). 
Epistemic bubbles can have dangerous material consequences.  
This raises questions about the responsibility new media developers have to alter the 
architecture of control that its users enjoy. This, in turn, raises questions about the latitude that 
social media developers have here. On the one hand, we might think developers should lead their 
users to consider a more diverse array of content than they currently do, even if that is not in line 
with users’ wishes. On the other, we might think that there is something objectionably 
paternalistic about this: Users should decide their information diets for themselves. 
We will argue that because so much of the internet information environment is 
epistemically noxious, there is lots of room and opportunity for epistemic paternalism (acting to 
improve the epistemic lot of another, regardless of the others’ wishes). In fact, we argue, 
epistemically paternalistic policies should be a perennial part of the internet information 
environment. We proceed as follows. First, we motivate a framework for guiding developers’ 
changes to their technologies. We then use the framework to show that an epistemically 
paternalistic policy Facebook enacted to combat fake news on its site is permissible. We close 
with reasons for thinking that epistemically paternalistic policies like the one we discuss should 
be a common feature of internet information environments. 
2. Unilateral Change 
Developers make unilateral changes to their technologies all of the time. They must in order for 
their products to function in the dynamic social, economic, and technological environments in 
which they operate. But which unilateral changes are developers permitted to make?  
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Begin by considering two cases. 
Mundane Update. In April of 2018, Facebook updated their plan to restrict data access 
on Facebook. This involved eliminating the Events API3, which enabled users to grant 
apps access to events they attended or hosted (which made it easy to add these events to 
one’s calendar). The update phased out this functionality because the Events API allowed 
applications to access private information about users without their consent. The 
functionality will be accessible again, to applications that meet stricter requirements than 
the site previously had (Schroepfer 2018). 
Emotional Contagion. For a week in 2012, Facebook ran a psychological experiment on 
689,003 unwitting users. Some of these users had content with “positive” emotional 
content filtered from their experience of the site. Others had content with “negative” 
emotional content filtered out. The study showed that “that emotional states can be 
transferred to others via emotional contagion, leading people to experience the same 
emotions without their awareness” (Kramer et al. 2014, 8788). 
In thinking about the limits of unilateral decision-making, it is helpful to keep both of these cases 
in view. We take it that Emotional Contagion was morally wrong and that Mundane Update was 
not, and we think most will agree. We'll explain our judgments of these cases to shed some light 
on the ethics of making unilateral changes to large social media platforms.  
 
3 API stands for Application Programming Interface. An API is a program that allows different 
applications to communicate to each other. 
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Why, exactly, was Mundane Update not morally wrong? We think that a good 
explanation is that it exposes no one to treatment they can reasonably reject.4 The only parties 
that might have a claim to rejecting the treatment they receive are the users of apps that depend 
on the Events API and the developers of those apps. Both parties are inconvenienced and have 
options taken away from them (the users cannot add events to their calendars automatically; the 
developers will eventually have to accommodate Facebook’s stricter requirements or cease to use 
the API). But these inconveniences are minor. No one seems to be harmed (the inconvenience 
does not rise to this level in either case), nor is anyone’s freedom or autonomy threatened (they 
are still able to do the underlying thing that matters, i.e., put important events in calendars, 
interface with Facebook, etc.). Further, the reasons that favor the update—i.e., protecting third 
parties from having their private information exposed without their permission or awareness—
are weighty. Given that the imposition is minor and the claims in favor substantial, the update 
exposes no one to a treatment they can reasonably reject. So, it is permissible.  
Using the same framework, we can explain why Emotional Contagion was morally 
wrong. Begin by asking what reasons the experimental subjects have for rejecting the treatment. 
Much of the criticism of the experiment focused on the idea that users may have been harmed by 
the experiment. One critic conjectured that Facebook could very well have killed users with their 
experiments, stating, “At their scale and with depressed people out there, it’s possible” (Goel, 
2014).  Perhaps Facebook did harm some users; at the very least it exposed them to the 
 
4 This approach is inspired by Scanlon (1998). 
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possibility. Perhaps experimental subjects have reasons for rejecting the experiment in virtue of 
this. Perhaps. But this is not our central complaint. 
Another, weightier reason experimental subjects have to reject the treatment is that it 
used them without their permission. There is a common idea, call it Consent, that there is a 
strong prima facie reason to avoid using people in ways they cannot consent to (cf. Korsgaard 
1996; cf. O’neill 1989; cf. Kant 1998). Facebook’s experiment is clearly in tension with Consent. 
The experiment denied users the opportunity to consent by exploiting their assumption that they 
would be interacting with a normal version of the site and surreptitiously exposing them to a faux 
version of the site in order to run the experiment. It did this without asking them whether they 
wanted to be part of an experiment and without letting them know about the experiment, thus it 
used them in ways they could not consent to. 
A possible objection to our assessment of Emotional Contagion is that A/B testing, the 
process of experimenting with different options in order to measure the relative success of each 
one (Deswal 2012), is known to be a common method for developing web-based products; thus, 
the experimental subjects were not used without their consent. According to this objection, 
Facebook didn’t exploit users’ assumption that they would be interacting with a normal version 
of the site. Rather, it did something they consented to by using the site, i.e., being exposed to 
different versions of the site in order to gain information about how it affects them and improve 
the site’s functionality.  
We find this response uncompelling. In ordinary A/B testing, users are exposed to 
slightly different versions of a site, each version of which is a candidate version of the site. In the 
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case of the Emotional Contagion experiment, users were not exposed to candidate versions of the 
site. Instead, they were exposed to defective versions of the site. So, even savvy users who 
interacted with Facebook in full awareness that the site might be in A/B testing would have had 
their expectations upset in Emotional Contagion.  
Now, the experimentee's claims against experimentation could be outweighed if the 
reasons for the experiment were weighty enough. But the reasons in favor of Emotional 
Contagion do not seem to be weighty at all. Facebook did not run the experiment because its 
users were at any substantial risk of harm (contrast this with Mundane Update, for example). 
Rather, the company was simply curious about how much positive and negative posts influenced 
their users.5  Further, Facebook had options available to them that did not involve surreptitious 
testing. As Facebook CTO Mike Schroepfer would later announce, “we should have considered 
other non-experimental ways to do this research” (Schroepfer 2014). Facebook also could have 
asked users if they wanted to volunteer for experimentation.  Of the roughly one billion users it 
had at the time, 689,003 would have been happy to oblige. 
Now that we have explained our judgments of Mundane Update and Emotional 
Contagion, we are in a position to step back and highlight a few features of the framework we 
 
5 In a vague apology for the experiment, Facebook’s COO said, “This was part of ongoing 
research companies do to test different products, and that was what it was” (Gibbs 2014). In a 
blogpost promising more transparency and greater care in research, Facebook’s CTO said that 
the emotional contagion hypothesis was “important to look into” (Schroepfer 2014). 
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have used. In thinking about whether some intervention is permissible, it is helpful to think about 
whether anyone who will be affected by it will be exposed to treatment they can reasonably 
reject. When thinking about others’ reasons for rejecting some treatment, it is helpful to think of 
whether the treatment will harm them, whether it respects their personhood, and what the reasons 
for the intervention are.6 These factors can push and pull against each other to make a treatment 
permissible or impermissible. 
3. Demoting Fake News 
Let us now consider a unilateral decision Facebook has made in their fight against fake news. 
Demoting Fake News. In April of 2019, Facebook announced that it would use a new 
metric, Click-Gap, to determine where to rank posts in one’s News Feed7. Click-Gap 
measures the gap between a website’s traffic from Facebook, compared to its traffic from 
the internet at large. The idea here is that if the website has a lot of traffic from Facebook 
and nowhere else, the site probably has low-quality content. Click-Gap is part of a 
measure to demote low-quality content, such as fake news, in the News Feed and prevent 
it from going viral on the website (Rosen 2019).  
 
6 There, of course, can be other factors and we cannot mention them all here (e.g., we have made 
no mention of considerations of justice or special relationships). 
7 "News Feed is a personalized, ever-changing collection of photos, videos, links, and updates 
from the friends, family, businesses, and news sources you've connected to on Facebook” 
(Facebook 2019). 
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In this section, we argue that this measure is an instance of permissible epistemic paternalism. 
We begin by explaining why it is an instance of epistemic paternalism. We then argue that it is 
permissible, despite being paternalistic. We close with reasons for thinking that epistemically 
paternalistic polices like this one should be common. 
A prima facie intuitive, standard definition of paternalism, owed to Gerald Dworkin 
(2017), is as follows: 
Paternalism. S acts paternalistically towards R by doing (omitting) Z iff: 
(C1) Z (or its omission) interferes with the liberty or autonomy of R.  
(C2) S does so without the consent of R.  
(C3) S does so just because Z will improve the welfare of R (where this includes 
preventing his welfare from diminishing), or in some way promote the interests, values, 
or good of R. 
Were we to accept this definition, Demoting Fake News would not be an instance of paternalism 
because (C1) is not met.   
It’s worth pausing for a moment to explain why. For the purposes of this discussion, we 
will follow John Christman (2018) in understanding an individual as autonomous when she is not 
directed by doxastic or conative attitudes that are not simply imposed externally on her, but are 
hers, authentically (i.e., she can reflectively endorse them), and free when she can act without 
external or internal constraints and has the resources to effectuate her desires. So, to determine 
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whether Demoting Fake News are paternalistic, we must ask whether they undermine users' 
autonomy or freedom. 
Begin with autonomy. If the policy works, it will play a role in shaping users’ doxastic 
attitudes (e.g., their beliefs about whether vaccines are safe). The crucial question, then, is 
whether the resulting attitudes will be authentic. It seems that they will be. Whatever effect the 
interventions will have on users’ attitudes, it will be by way of shielding users from 
misinformation masquerading as information. Users affected by the policy will then be prevented 
from forming inauthentic attitudes. This is because people (for the most part) will that their 
doxastic attitudes are justified and accurate. Now, there might be users who want to be anti-
vaxxers, come what may. Perhaps they value being a member of the conspiracy-theorist 
community more than they value good epistemic hygiene. However, such users are not going to 
have their considerations changed by an intervention like Demoting Fake News.8 The touch of 
this intervention is far too light for that. So, (C1) is not met in the case of Demoting Fake News 
in virtue of the effects that it has on autonomy. 
 
8 This isn’t to say that the architecture of social media sites can’t influence users in important 
ways. We think take it that the “technological seduction” that sites like YouTube exhibit (cf. 
Alfano et al. (2019)) can encroach on autonomy by, for example, seeding and nurturing 
convictions that either can’t be endorsed upon reflection or have been seeded and nurtured 
through methods that agents are alienated from. 
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 We take it that a similar conclusion holds with respect to liberty. Demoting Fake News 
does not constrain what users can do. The policy may bring about a state of affairs that some 
might not like, namely one where an unvarnished experience of Facebook is not possible. But 
bringing about a state of affairs that is not desired hardly consists in constraining what one can 
do; and under this policy users can still post what they were able to post before, follow 
whomever they were able to follow before, and so on. So, the claim that Demoting Fake News 
limits users’ freedom strains credulity.  
Despite failing to meet (C1), we think that Demoting Fake News is an instance of a kind 
of paternalism. This is because we reject the common definition of paternalism. To see why, 
consider the following case from Shane Ryan (2016): 
Smoke Alarm. Suppose that a mother is worried about the safety of her son in his new 
apartment. It’s his first time living away from home and his mother knows that there is no 
smoke alarm in his apartment. She thinks that if she were to suggest that he get one, then 
he would agree, but knowing him as she does, she doesn’t believe that he would actually 
get one. She knows that he is very proud of his new-found independence, and she thinks 
that if she were to ask him whether he would like her to buy him one he would say no. 
She decides to buy him one anyway and, by offering it to him already bought, tries to 
make his acceptance of it a fait accompli (Ryan 2016, 126). 
In this case, (C1) does not obtain and, yet, the mother acts paternalistically towards the son.  
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That Paternalism is susceptible to counterexamples like Smoke Alarm is the primary 
reason9 that we are motivated to accept a less standard account of paternalism, owed to Ryan 
(2016):  
Paternalism*. S acts paternalistically towards R by doing (omitting) Z iff:  
(C1∗) S does so irrespective of what S believes the wishes of R may be.  
(C2∗) S does so just because S judges that Z may or will advance R’s ends (her welfare, 
interests, values or good). 
By the lights of this definition, Demoting Fake News could qualify as a paternalistic 
intervention, so long as it is motivated by Facebook's judgment that improving people's 
epistemic lot improves their welfare.  
Now, the relationship between having true (or accurate, etc.) or justified (or rational, etc.) 
doxastic attitudes and one’s welfare is complicated (for a survey of these issues see (Hazlett 
 
9 But it is not the only reason. As Ryan (2016) points, there are other difficulties with Dworkin 
(2017)’s definition. (C3) states that S Z’s because Z‘ing will improve the welfare of R. But, it 
seems more apt to say that S Z’s because S judges that  Z’ing may improve R’s welfare. Further, 
(C2) seems to stand in need of correction, because we seem to be able to act paternalistically in 
cases where the paternalism is welcomed. To illustrate this, Ryan (2016) gives the example of a 
Victorian wife who has internalized sexist norms and is happy to let her husband make decisions 
for her. That the husband handles the wife’s matters for her and for her own good seems 
paternalistic, even though she sees his handling of her matters as legitimate. 
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2013)). Knowing a fact can be irrelevant to our ends (e.g., knowing how far two randomly 
selected grains in the Sahara are from one another (Sosa 2000)).  It can even be detrimental (e.g., 
knowing how a movie ends before you’ve seen it (Kelly 2003)). So, we find it helpful to couch 
the remaining discussion in terms of epistemic paternalism.  
Epistemic Paternalism. S acts epistemically paternalistically towards R by doing 
(omitting) Z iff10:  
(C1∗∗) S does so irrespective of what S believes the wishes of R may be.  
(C2∗∗) S does so just because S judges that Z may or will make R epistemically better off. 
We will follow Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013, esp. 50-61) in understanding someone as 
epistemically better off when she undergoes an epistemic Pareto improvement with respect to a 
question that is of interest to her. An epistemic Pareto improvement consists in an improvement 
along at least one epistemic dimension of evaluation without deterioration with respect to any 
 
10 Note that our definition of epistemic paternalism breaks from the common understanding of the 
concept, owed to Ahlstrom-Vij (2013), which states that “a practice is epistemically paternalistic 
if and only if it interferes with the freedom of inquirers to conduct inquiry in whatever way they 
see fit [...] without consulting those interfered with on the issue of whether they should be 
interfered with in the relevant manner [...] for the purpose of making those interfered with 
epistemically better off (Ahlstrom-Vij 2013, 61). Our break from Ahlstrom-Vij is less a 
philosophical dispute than a difference of interest in focus. 
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other epistemic dimension of evaluation. Following Ahlstrom-Vij, we take it that reliability, 
having a high ratio of true-to false beliefs, is a dimension of epistemic evaluation. 
By the lights of Epistemic Paternalism, Demoting Fake News is epistemically 
paternalistic. As Adam Mosseri, VP of News Feed explains, Demoting Fake News aims to fight 
fake news’s effect of making the world less informed (Mosseri 2017). That is, the policy has 
been enacted because Facebook believes that they will make users epistemically better off (i.e. 
(C2**) is met). In explaining the responsibility Facebook has for doing its share in the fight, 
Mosseri likens Facebook’s responsibility to the responsibility teachers have to fight 
misinformation. This, we think, is apt. Teachers are often epistemically paternalistic towards 
their students—they guide students’ education in ways that are insensitive to students’ wishes, in 
order to make the students epistemically better off. And, like teachers, Facebook would not 
change course were it to learn that Demoting Fake News was unwelcomed (i.e., (C1**) is 
satisfied). This is because of the kind of pressure Facebook is reacting to when it demotes fake 
news, i.e., pressure from the public and, increasingly, governments11 to fight fake news. Having 
articulated the ways in which Demoting Fake News is paternalistic, let us now turn to the moral 
question: is it permissible? 
To answer, consider the two constituencies that might have a claim against the policy: 
users of Facebook and purveyors of fake news. 
 
11 Germany is proposing a law to fine Facebook for advertisements containing fake news (Olsen 
2016). 
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Begin with the users. What claim might they have against the policy? Well, it’s not 
plausible that they are harmed, so they can’t appeal to that. Nor is the policy in tension with 
Consent. Facebook has been open about its campaign to fight fake news, and in any event, it is 
reasonable to expect curators of news feeds to exercise discretion, especially against misleading 
or otherwise low-quality content.  
Disgruntled users might retort that the opportunity to see more fake news than they would 
under this policy has been taken away without their consent. But, importantly, Consent does not 
speak against affecting people without their consent. Rather, it speaks against using them in ways 
they are not able to consent to. And using someone—as opposed to merely affecting them—
involves intending their presence or participation to contribute to achieving the end (Kerstein 
2013; Kerstein 2019; Scanlon 2008; Guerrero 2016). Removing the option to see more fake news 
does not violate this standard, because eliminating it does not intend the presence or participation 
of users who would like to have the option.  
As a last recourse, users might appeal to autonomy or liberty. But as we argued above, 
the policies do not undermine users’ autonomy or liberty; they do not instill in users inauthentic 
attitudes, nor do they limit users’ abilities to effectuate their desires. In light of these 
considerations, it does not seem that there are users who could reasonably object to Demoting 
Fake News. 
Let’s, then, turn to the purveyors of fake news. They may claim that this policy harms 
them (or their businesses), and that this is morally relevant. It is hard to know how much weight, 
if any, this appeal should have. This is for several reasons. One is that fake news is an affront to 
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users’ autonomy: it is misinformation masquerading as information, and thus doxastic attitudes 
based on it are inauthentic. Another reason is that the purveyors are left with alternatives under 
this policy. It leaves them free to promote vaccine hesitancy (or whatever cause they seek to 
advance), so long as their methods do not subvert user autonomy in the way just described. So, 
they are left with the options that allow them to minimize (or eliminate) any harm done to them. 
They just have to do it in ways that is more respectful to users.  
Purveyors may try to appeal to Consent. We do not think they will get any traction here 
either. Consent, recall, stated that there a strong prima facie reason to avoid using people in ways 
they cannot consent to. Demoting Fake News does not use purveyors. It does not require the 
presence or participation of purveyors to contribute to achieving its end. To demonstrate this, it 
might be helpful to consider a policy that would use purveyors of fake news. Facebook could 
institute a policy where any person or organization caught promoting fake news was digitally 
strung up and shamed for reasons of deterrence. The deterrence policy in that case requires using 
the purveyors of fake news. 
 Finally, purveyors may appeal to considerations of autonomy or liberty. As with the 
appeal to Consent, it is difficult to see how purveyors’ autonomy might be compromised, as 
Demoting Fake News does not involve anything that might affect purveyors’ attitudes. The 
liberty of purveyors is not compromised either. We have already stated why: under Demoting 
Fake News, purveyors are free to advance the ideas they support or the profit they seek (they just 
might not be able to pursue these aims quite as effectively, if they do not change their current 
approaches). 
19 
 
 
This is a preprint of a chapter that appears in revised form in Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: 
Conceptions, Justifications, and Implications, edited by Amiel Bernal and Guy Axtell (London: Roman & 
Littlefield, 2020): pp. 29-44. This version is free to view and download for private research and study 
only. Please cite to the final version. 
 
Let us now turn to the reasons that speak in favor of Demoting Fake News. It is 
reasonable to think that it will prevent significant harms to individuals. Policies like Demoting 
Fake News have proved to be quite effective. For instance, in November 2016 Facebook, 
updated its Facebook Audience Network policy, which banned ads that contain or promote fake 
news (Wingfield at al. 2016). As a result, the sharing of fake news among users on the site fell by 
roughly 75% (Chiou and Tucker, 2018). Given that fake news is a driver of harmful movements, 
such as vaccine hesitancy, there is a strong consideration in favor of the policy. After all, those 
who wind up sick because of vaccine hesitancy are significantly harmed.  
Harm reduction is not the only effect Demoting Fake News has. It also supports user 
autonomy. Consider: 
A growing body of evidence demonstrates that consumers struggle to evaluate the 
credibility and accuracy of online content. Experimental studies find that exposure to 
online information that is critical of vaccination leads to stronger anti-vaccine beliefs, 
since individuals do not take into account the credibility of the content (Nan and Madden, 
2012; Betsch et al., 2010, 2013; Allam et al., 2014). Survey evidence […] shows that 
only half of low-income parents of children with special healthcare needs felt 
“comfortable determining the quality of health websites” (Knapp et al., 2011). Since only 
12% of US adults are proficient in health literacy with 36% at basic or below basic levels 
(Kutner et al., 2006), Fu et al. (2016) state that […] “low-quality antivaccine web pages 
[…] promote compelling but unsubstantiated messages [opposing vaccination]” (Chiou 
and Tucker, 2018). 
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Far from being disrespectful to agents’ autonomy (something paternalistic policies are often 
accused of), epistemically paternalistic policies like Demoting Fake News are an important 
element of respecting it; the policy, if successful, will protect users from internalizing attitudes 
that would be inauthentically held.  
So, Demoting Fake News is a policy no one could reasonably reject; further, there are 
compelling reasons to enact it. So, it is justified. In fact, it is for these reasons that Facebook 
must engage policies like Demoting Fake News: users who adopt unwarranted beliefs because of 
fake news and individuals who contract illnesses because of vaccine hesitancy have a very strong 
claim against Facebook’s taking a laissez-faire approach to combating fake news on its site. 
Since much of the internet information environment is epistemically noxious, there is lots 
of room and opportunity for interventions, such as Demoting Fake news, that are epistemically 
paternalistic. Hence, many epistemically paternalistic policies can (and should) be a perennial 
part of the internet information environment. What should we conclude from that? Well, one 
thing is that we should recognize that developers should engage in epistemic paternalism as a 
matter of course. Another is that our focus in evaluating epistemically-relevant interventions 
should not be on whether such actions are epistemically paternalistic. Rather, it should be on 
how they relate to other values (such as well-being, autonomy, freedom, and so on). 
4. Conclusions and Caveats 
What we have offered here are really only the opening moves of a longer discussion about how, 
exactly, to manage new media in ways that appropriately balances the interests of everyone 
involved. The policy we have discussed governs with a fairly light touch.  But initiatives like 
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Demoting Fake News may be limited by the same fact that makes them justifiable, i.e., that they 
govern with a light touch. These policies may be able to pop epistemic bubbles, but they may not 
be able to dismantle sturdier structures, such as echo chambers (epistemic structures that, like 
epistemic bubbles, leave relevant sources of information out; but, unlike epistemic bubbles, 
actively discredit those sources (Nguyen forthcoming)). There is good reason to look into what 
we may do to chip away at these structures. Social media sites—8chan12, which has been 
 
12 “an online message board that [...] characterizes itself as the “darkest reaches” of the online 
world in its tagline and has fostered a reputation as a nearly lawless space for free speech” 
(Stewart, 2019). 
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associated with the radicalization of many mass shooters (Stewart 2019), being a potent 
example—foster echo chambers that light-touch policies will likely be ineffective against. This 
raises questions about which interventions can dismantle echo chambers and which (if any) of 
them may be enacted.  
 
